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JURISDICTION OF COURT 
This is an appeal by the Defendants/Appellants 
(hereinafter Appellants) to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to 
Article VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah and Section 78-2-2, Utah Code Annotated from the Summary 
Judgment rendered by the Honorable James S. Sawaya of the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, Civil No. 910900664. The Utah Supreme Court referred 
the matter to The Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 
78-2a-3(j), Utah Code Annotated. 
References to pleadings in the record are given by the 
pleading title. No transcript numbers are given as no 
transcript was ordered only record pages. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Was the Summary Judgment granted by the Honorable 
Judge, James S. Sawaya in favor of the appellees and against 
the appellants proper? 
The standard of review for this Court from a grant of 
Summary Judgment is that the appellate court will view the 
facts in a light most favorable to the losing party and will 
determine whether those facts require, as a matter of law, the 
entry of judgment. The appellate court will give no deference 
to the trial court's conclusions of law, which are reviewed 
for correctness. Schurtz v BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 
(Utah 1991). But when it appears from the pleadings on file, 
the affidavits in support and in opposition to the motion for 
Summary Judgment and having heard counsel for both sides and 
there appears to be no genuine issue of material fact, then 
summary is not only proper, but required. Burninqham v. Ott, 
525 P.2d 620, (Utah 1974). 
2. Are the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
determined and entered by the trial court correct? 
The standard of review of the appellate court relating to 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, (Addendum iv) is 
fully set forth in Rule 52 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
wherein it states: 
"....Findings of Fact, whether based upon oral 
or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall 
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be given to the opportunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses.11 
As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Grayson Roper LTD. v. 
Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, (Utah 1989), page 470; 
"...On the other hand, a trial court's findings 
of fact are given deferential review.... To 
successfully attack a trial court's findings of 
fact, an appellant must first marshal all the 
evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that the evidence, including all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is 
insufficient to support the findings against an 
attack under Rule 52(a) standard, [citations 
omitted]..." 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of case; 
This appeal is taken from the final Summary Judgment 
entered by the Honorable James S. Sawaya in the Third Judicial 
District Court against Cory Curtis and Arwella Curtis, 
Appellants, and in favor of William Christopulos & Elvira 
Christopulos, Appellees. 
The action involved the breach and default of a trust 
deed note by the appellants. The trust deed note was entered 
into by the appellants on February 1, 1987 with a Mr. Darrell 
B. Hicks. (Addendum i) This trust deed note was assigned to 
the Appellees on February 20, 1987. (Addendum ii) This trust 
deed note was subordinate to other notes covering a piece of 
real property and a prior lien holder foreclosed on the real 
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property. The Appellees commenced this suit on the trust deed 
note to recover sums that were past due and owing. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition: 
1. Appellees commenced suit against the appellants on 
January 30, 1991. (R.2) 
2. Appellants were served the summons and complaint on 
February 14, 1991 and the return of service was filed with the 
court. (Ft.8) 
3. Appellant's counsel filed an answer and counterclaim 
to Appellees complaint on March 6, 1991. (R.9). No jury was 
requested. 
4. Appellee's counsel filed a motion to dismiss the 
counterclaim on March 13, 1991. (R.16) 
5. Appellant's counsel filed a reply to appellees motion 
to dismiss (R.20) and the matter was submitted to the court 
for decision. (R.23) 
6. On April 9, 1991 the Court denied appellees motion to 
dismiss. (R.25) 
7. On April 17, 1991 appellees served upon the appellants 
their first set of Requests for Admissions, Interrogatories 
and Requests for Production of Documents (R.25A) and replied 
to appellants counterclaim. (R.26) 
8. On May 17, 1991 counsel for appellants withdrew as 
counsel. (R.28) 
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9. On May 21, 1991 appellees filed a Request to Appear in 
Person or Appoint New Counsel and then on May 30, 1991 (R.31) 
appellants filed an appearance pro se. (R.32) 
10. In a document dated May 15, 1991, appellants 
attempted to answer appellees discovery requests.(Addendum 
iii) . 
11. On January 10, 1992 appellees filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment against the appellants together with 
affidavits. (R.35) 
12. On January 29, 1992 appellees' counsel filed a Notice 
to Submit it's Motion for Summary Judgment to the court. 
(R.51) 
13. On February 4, 1992 appellants filed a document, 
dated January 20, 1992, in opposition to appellees' Motion for 
Summary Judgment entitled "Final Response and Motion to 
dismiss plaintiff's claim and award defendants appropriate 
damages as heretofore mentioned in the defendants 
counterclaim." (R.52) Appellants never filed any documents 
under oath or affidavits in response to appellees' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
14. On February 10, 1992 appellees filed their response 
to the document filed by the appellants on February 4, 1992. 
(R.62) 
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15. On February 13, 1992 the court denied appellees 
Motion for Summary Judgment stating no reasons for the denial. 
(R.64) 
16. On June 16, 1992 appellees requested a trial setting 
(R.65) and a non jury trial was set in this matter on 
September 22, 1992 with a pre trial conference set for 
September 14, 1992 in the Third District Court before the 
Honorable* Judge James S. Sawaya. (R.66, R.68) 
17. On September 14, 1992 the Appellees with their 
counsel and the appellant, Cory Curtis, appeared at the pre 
trial conference. Appellant, Arwella Curtis did not appear. At 
the pretrial conference matters were discussed and settlement 
was encouraged. Also, at the pretrial conference the court on 
it's own motion continued the trial date as there was a 
conflict with another matter. No new trial date was set. 
18. On September 16, 1992 appellees filed a Motion with 
the court to Reconsider Their Motion for Summary Judgment. 
(R.69) 
19. On September 21, 1992 appellants filed a letter with 
the court. (R.71) 
20. On September 30, 1992 appellants filed a response to 
appellees' Motion to Reconsider Their Motion for Summary 
Judgment entitled "Motion to Deny Plaintiffs Motion for a 
Reconsideration for a Summary Judgment and Request for Jury 
Trial." (R.77) 
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21. On September 30/ 1992 appellees asked the court to 
submit for decision their Motion to Reconsider and Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (R.72) 
22. On October 22, 1992 the court granted appellees' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R.82) 
23. On October 26, 1992 the appellees counsel, prepared, 
filed and mailed to the appellants their proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment. (R.83, Addendum iv, 
v) Judgment was signed on October 27, 1992. (Addendum v) 
24. On November 6, 1992 an attorney for the appellants 
(the same attorney that withdrew earlier) filed a Motion to 
Amend Judgment. (R.90). No objections to the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law or the Judgment was filed by the appellants 
or their counsel. 
25. On November 12, 1992 appellees filed their response 
to the appellants1 Motion to Amend Judgment. (R.102) 
26. On November 23, 1992 appellees counsel filed a notice 
to Submit for Decision appellants' Motion to Amend Judgment. 
(R.112) 
27. On November 23, 1992 the court denied appellants' 
Motion to Amend judgment. (R.114) Appellees counsel prepared 
the Order and the Order was signed on December 7, 1992. 
(R.115) 
28. Notice of Appeal was filed by the appellants on 
December 18, 1992. (R.127) Defendants again filed a second 
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notice to appear pro se on December 18, 1992. (R.126). There 
has been no withdrawal of counsel by defendants counsel. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Appellees and appellants have admitted to the 
jurisdiction of the person and the subject matter by the Third 
District Court of Salt Lake County and have further admitted 
that venue is proper (Finding of Fact, paragraph 1 R.84;) 
1. Appellants entered into a written trust deed and trust 
deed note (hereinafter the trust deed note will be referred to 
a the "promissory note") with a Mr. Darrell B. Hicks on or 
about February 1, 1987. A true and exact copy of the 
promissory note is attached hereto as part of the addendum 
and incorporated herein by this reference. (Defendants answer 
to plaintiff's complaint, paragraph 2, (R.9); Findings of 
Fact, paragraph 2 (R.84)). 
2. On or about March 6, 1987 the trust deed and trust 
deed note (promissory note) was assigned to appellees. A true 
and exact copy of which is in the addendum and incorporated 
herein by his reference. (Findings of Fact, paragraph 3, 
(R.84)) 
3. Under the terms of the promissory note, exhibit A, 
appellants were to pay to the appellees the sum of $13,500.00 
which was to also collect interest on the unpaid sums at the 
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rate of 5.7% per annum. (Findings of Fact, paragraph 4, 
(R.84)). 
4. Under the terms of the promissory note, appellants 
were to make payments of "principal and interest payable as 
follows: 
Semi-annual interest payments representing 5.7% per 
annum of the unpaid balance were to commence on August 1, 1987 
and continue through the term of the contract. Lump sum 
principal payments of $4,000.00 were due on February 1, 1992; 
and $4,000.00 due on February 1, 1997; and $5,500.00 plus any 
accrued interest, representing the last semi-annual interest 
payment, as a final payment was to be due on February 1, 2002. 
(Findings of Fact paragraph 5, (R.84)). 
5. The three lump sum payments total only $13,500.00. 
6. The promissory note allows for "semi annual payments" 
on the "principal and interest" commencing August 1, 1987. 
(Findings of Fact, paragraph 5, (R.84)). 
7. The interest accumulated on $13,500.00 at the rate of 
5.7% per annum is $64,125 per month or $384.75 semi-annually. 
(Findings of Fact, paragraph 6, (R.85)). 
8. Appellants made four payments, semi-annually of 
$384.75. (See docketing statement of appellants, page 3; 
Finding of Fact, paragraph 7, (R. 85)). 
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9. No other payments have been made on the principal or 
interest on the promissory note and appellants are in default. 
(Findings of Fact# paragraph 8, (R.85)). 
10. The amount owing under the terms of the promissory 
note is $16,767.66 as of October 27, 1992. (Findings of Fact, 
paragraph 9, (R.85)). 
11. Appellees retained an attorney to help them collect 
under the terms of the promissory note and the amount claimed 
to be owing to the attorney as of October 27, 1992, in the 
amount of $1,601.00, is reasonable. (Findings of Fact, 
paragraph 10, (R.85)). 
12. Appellees have made no misrepresentations to the 
appellants. (Findings of Fact, paragraph 11, (R.85)). 
13. Appellees filed suit against the appellants in 
January, 1991, due to default in payment under the promissory 
note and the appellees acted properly in commencing the 
lawsuit at that time. (Findings of Fact, Paragraph 12, 
(R.85)). 
14. Appellants' attorney filed an answer and counterclaim 
to this lawsuit in March, 1991. Appellants did not request a 
jury trial. The district judge was the trier of fact. 
15. Appellees filed discovery requests of the appellants 
and after the discovery was due the attorneys for the 
appellants withdrew as counsel for the appellants. (R.28). 
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16. Appellees requested a trial in this matter. A 
pretrial conference was set for September 14, 1992 and non 
jury trial was set for September 22, 1992. The appellant, Cory 
Curtis appeared at the pre-trial conference, appellant, 
Arwella Curtis, did not. Appellees appeared and were 
represented by counsel. The matter was discussed and 
settlement was encouraged. The court on it's own motion, due 
to a conflict with another matter, struck the trial date in 
this matter. 
17. In September, 1992, after the pretrial conference and 
the trial being continued, appellees asked the court to 
reconsider their Motion for Summary Judgment. The Summary 
Judgment was granted. (Addendum v) 
18. Appellees filed the Judgment together with Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law with the court which were 
accepted and signed by the Court on October 27, 1992. 
Appellants did not objected to the Findings of Fact or 
Conclusions of Law. (A true and exact copy of said Findings of 
Fact and Conclusion of Law and said judgment is part of the 
addendum iv, v). Appellants counsel did file a Motion to Amend 
Judgment which was denied. (R.90). 
19. Appellants did attempt to make payment after the 
lawsuit was filed to the appellees for the sum of $2,076.25 
which check was not negotiated and returned to the appellants 
immediately. Appellants were informed that this was not a 
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proper payment under the terms of the promissory note and the 
payment was being returned. 
16. Attached in the addendum are the pro se responses by 
the Appellees to appellants Requests for Admissions, 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents. 
(Addendum iii) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court in granting the summary judgment after allowing 
the appellants over twenty two months to prove there claims 
was proper. There are no material questions of fact to be 
considered to prevent the granting the Summary Judgment as 
the contract is clear on it's face. Even if the contract is 
questioned as to clarity, then the only competent extrinsic 
evidence properly before the court would still allow the 
Summary Judgment. The Judge in this matter is the trier of 
fact as no jury was requested. 
There was no judgment rendered at the pretrial conference 
and the effort to introduce new evidence at the appellate 
court level is improper. 
There was not objection to the Findings of Fact or 
Conclusions of Law and therefore should not be disturbed. 
This is just and effort by the appellants to delay this 
matter and prevent the appellees from collecting their money. 
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Appellants should be awarded their attorneys fees in defending 
this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
The Judgment is Proper 
A. The Summary Judgment is proper. 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
"...The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories 
and admissions on file (emphasis added) together with 
the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
The purpose of Summary Judgment is to look beyond the mere 
allegations in the pleadings to see if there exists any 
genuine issue as to any material fact. If there appears to be 
none, then the trial court should then award judgment to the 
moving party when adequate proof is submitted in support of 
the motion. Pleadings alone are not sufficient to raise an 
issue of fact. Dupler v. Yates, 351 P.2d 624, 10 Utah2d 250 
(1960). 
The opposing party should at a minimum produce some 
evidence to contradict the movant's case and raise a question 
of fact. Summary Judgment is not a harsh rule. When it 
appears from the pleadings on file, the affidavits in support 
of and in opposition to (if any) the motion for Summary 
Judgment, and any arguments of counsel for parties, that there 
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appears to be no genuine issue of fact, summary judgment is 
the only proper procedure the courts should use. Burninqham v. 
Ott, 525 P.2d 620, (Utah 1974). Defendants have had ample 
time, over twenty-two months, to present their evidence in 
support of their alleged defenses and claims and they have 
failed to do so. 
The appellants, both by their pro se pleadings and by the 
pleadings filed by their counsel state that n[t]he essential 
facts of this case are undisputed'1 and that fi[t]he only issue 
in this case is regarding the effect, if any, of the words, 
'Semi-annual payments commencing August 1 and February 1 semi-
annually" . Appellants stated in their pleadings that the only 
issue is a legal question. This is in conflict with the 
claims made in appellants brief. They say there are remaining 
questions of fact. Never has appellants set forth what these 
"questions of fact" are or how they may be material. In 
appellants pleading entitled "Motion to Deny Plaintiffs Motion 
for a Reconsideration for a Summary Judgment and Request for 
Jury Trial" they state that "the legal dispute [emphasis 
added] has always been based on WHEN interest is to be paid, 
not if interest is due on the note." (R.77) Appellants do not 
dispute the amounts in the promissory note, that the note was 
signed by them, that the note as assigned to the appellees, 
that interest is owing on the note and that here has been no 
payments on this note since 1989 and the note requires 
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payments semi-annually. In fact, appellants admit that they 
made payments of exactly an amount that would be owing as 
interest on the note ($384.75) for at least two years semi-
annually before they ceased making payments on the note and 
thus became in default. Appellants have never objected to or 
disputed these facts and in fact admitted them in their 
pleading and brief. 
Appellants have had ample time to support their 
allegations, present evidence, respond to evidence, examine 
witnesses and do discovery contrary to the statements in their 
brief. They have repeatedly failed, either by their counsel 
or by themselves, to present any facts, documents or 
affidavits to controvert the evidence of the appellees or to 
change the conclusions of the trial court. 
Appellants have a burden to present some evidence in the 
trial court to establish their allegations and defenses. This 
is their burden of proof. The Utah Supreme Court stated in 
Koeslinq v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043, 1046 (Utah 1975) that: 
"The proponent of a proposition has two 
burdens relative to his proof: to produce 
evidence which proves or tends to prove the 
proposition asserted; and to persuade the trier 
of fact that his evidence is more credible or 
entitled to the greater weight, (footnote 
omitted)" 
Appellants failed to produce any competent evidence at the 
trial court level and was thus unable to persuade the trier of 
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fact, here the judge, that their evidence was more credible 
than the evidence produced by the appellees. The trial court 
is under an obligation to only look at the evidence which is 
properly before it. 
The standard of review in this matter regarding Summary 
Judgment is clear. In reviewing a Summary Judgment the 
appellate court must look at the fact in the light favorable 
to the losing party, here the appellants, and determine if the 
facts are still sufficient to support a motion for Summary 
Judgment. (Wineqar v. Froerer Corp. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 
1991)). If it appears from the pleadings on file, the 
affidavits filed in support and in opposition to the motion 
for Summary Judgment and having heard the statements of 
counsel, or the parties, from both sides and there appears to 
be no genuine issues as to material fact, then Summary 
Judgment is not only proper, but required. Burninqham v. Ott, 
525 P.2d 620, (Utah 1974). The facts are clearly sufficient to 
support the Summary Judgment. In viewing the facts before the 
court in this matter, there is only one legal conclusion, 
which is the one arrived at by the trial court in it's rulings 
and judgment. The Findings of Fact by the trial court found 
that appellants promised to make payment of money to the 
appellees, including interest being paid semi-annually. 
Appellants failed to make said payments when due and are 
therefore in default of the promissory note. Inasmuch as a 
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challenge to summary judgment presents for review conclusions 
of law only, the appellate court reviews those conclusions for 
correctness based upon the undisputed facts. 
A decision by a trial court is completely discretionary 
on the part of the trial judge and it is not improper just 
because "reasonable men could draw different conclusions from 
conflicting evidence. (Pollesche v. Transamerica Ins. Co. 27 
Utah 2d 430, 497 P.2d 236 (1972)). There has been no abuse of 
discretion on the part of the trial court in rendering this 
judgment. 
B. Contract Interpretation: 
The appellants claim that the contract has not been 
interpreted correctly. In interpreting a contact, a court 
shall determine what the parties intended by examining the 
entire contract and all of its parts in connection with each 
other. The court will give an objective and reasonable 
construction to the contract as a whole. Sears v. Riemersma, 
655 P.2d 1105, 1107-1108 (Utah 1982); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis 
Nat. Bank, 737 P.2d 225 (Utah 1987). In interpreting a 
contract, the court should act so as to harmonize all of its 
terms and provisions, and all of its terms and provisions be 
given effect if possible. The contract ( here the promissory 
note) is clear. It states that appellants will pay the sum of 
"Thirteen Thousand, Five hundred and no/100 Dollars 
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($13,500.00) together with interest from date (emphasis added) 
at the rate of Five & 07/100 per cent (5.7%) per annum on the 
unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as 
follows; (emphasis added) 
Semi-annual payments commencing August 1, and February 1, 
semi-annually." 
It is clear that appellants were to make a payment every 
six months. The interest on $13,500.00 at 5.7% for six months 
is $384.75. Appellants did pay at four (4) payments of 
$384.75 at six month intervals on or near August 1 and 
February 1. Clearly they chose to keep current on the 
interest only, with no payments being made to the principal. 
At this rate, appellants were to make the full lump sum 
payments according to the terms of the note at the times they 
were due. Appellants argument asks the question of how were 
the appellants going to calculate the interest on the sums 
prior to each lump sum payment? It appears that no interest 
was owing. Appellants did attempt to make a payment in April, 
1992 of a sum less than $4,000.00 and it did not include any 
payments toward interest, (see appellants brief, addendum). 
What was the interest going to be at the end of the note based 
upon the calculations of the appellants in making this first 
payment?. It appears that it would be some great sum or none 
at all. This is clearly contrary to the terms of the 
promissory note. It would be wise to note here that 
22 
appellants failed to make any payments "semi-annually11 under 
the terms of the note after 1989 which is why it was declared 
in default and suit was commenced. 
Contracts must receive a reasonable construction 
according to the intentions of the parties and the terms of 
the agreements. An interpretation which will bring about an 
equitable result will be preferred over a harsh or inequitable 
one. An interpretation of the contract should be adopted 
which under all the circumstances of the case, ascribes the 
most reasonable, equitable, probable reading of the contract. 
The court must accord commonly accepted meanings to the words 
or phrases to a contract wherever possible. Gordon v. CRS 
Consulting Engineers, Inc., 820 P.2d 492 (Utah App. 1991). 
The interpretation offered by the appellants is not 
reasonable, probable or equitable. They claim that interest, 
if any, would only be due at the end of the note. They can 
pay what they wish, when they wish and deduct the sum from the 
principal due and owing without incurring interest. This 
would be an improbable and an inequitable result. 
C. Is the Contract Ambiguous? 
Appellants also claim that the promissory note is 
ambiguous. Appellees deny that the trust deed note is 
ambiguous. "The language of a contract is not necessarily 
ambiguous merely because a party urges a different meaning 
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that is more in accordance with its own interests." Larson v. 
Overland Thrift & Loan, 818 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Utah App.1991), 
cert, denied, 832 P.2d 476 (Utah 1992). Appellants hope the 
contract is ambiguous in order to justify the default and 
limit their liability. This should not succeed. 
If a contract is ambiguous, parole evidence or extrinsic 
is admissible to explain the parties intent. When ambiguity 
exists, the interest of the parties is a question of fact to 
be determined by the finder of fact. Plateau Min. v. Utah Div. 
of State Lands, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990). In this matter 
the finder of fact was the trial court judge as no jury was 
requested. The trial court judge had the opportunity to 
review the documents, talk to the appellant Cory Curtis, and 
hear the arguments of both sides before making any ruling. 
The parol and extrinsic evidence before the court was 
provided by the appellees, under oath, and admitted as fact by 
the appellants. (R.10, R.52, Brief Pg. 8)) Appellants 
presented NO evidence to contradict to the statements and 
affidavits of the appellants in spite of having over twenty-
two months to provide contrary evidence. The actions by the 
appellants of making the $384.75 payments semi-annually on the 
promissory note exactly in accordance with appellees 
interpretation of the terms of the promissory note and in an 
amount exactly equal to interest on $13,500.00 at 5.7% per 
annum would indicate that the appellants understood that the 
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payments were for interest and were due semi-annually. This is 
admitted in appellents brief (Brief pg. 8). Why else were the 
payments made? Appellants never explained the reasons for the 
payments being made. 
D. Judgment at pretrial conference: 
Appellants also claim that a judgment was rendered at the 
pretrial conference. The facts do not support this claim. 
Settlement was encouraged by Judge Sawaya, in a manner similar 
to all other judges at their pretrial conference in my 
experience. The judgment was rendered on appellees Motion for 
Summary Judgment days after the pretrial conference. The 
appellants claim that the action by Judge Sawaya prejudiced 
them in obtaining a settlement, to their satisfaction, of the 
matter. Why was it prejudicial? Could it be that appellants 
knew they were in default and they hoped to "rewrite" the 
terms of the contract to better suit their circumstances? The 
appellants know that they owe the money and are just 
attempting to change the terms of the contract. 
E: Did the court rewrite the contract? 
Appellants further rely upon Dalton v. Jerico 
Construction Company, 642 P.2d 748, (Utah 1982) for the 
proposition that " a court cannot improvidently rewrite a 
contract entered into at arms length between parties." This 
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is true. The Utah Supreme Court stated in Dalton, infra, at 
750, "...the contract between the parties control." The 
contract controls in this matter and the contract is clear on 
its face the intent of the parties with regards to the payment 
of principal and interest. This contract is not being 
rewritten. It is the court's responsibility to make a ruling 
based upon the facts before it and this is why the Summary 
Judgment was granted. 
F. Presentation of new evidence. 
Appellants claim they have discovered new evidence that 
may change the outcome of this matter. First, New evidence 
cannot be presented at this time, it would be improper. 
Second, appellants did not say when the new evidence was 
discovered and no motion was made in the trial court to 
reconsider the matter based upon the alleged new evidence. 
Third, the alleged new evidence is not relevant to this issues 
between these parties and would not change the judgment or 
appellants liability in this matter. 
Point II 
The Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law are Proper 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law accepted and 
signed by the trial court are not erroneous and should not be 
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disturbed pursuant to the standard found in Rule 52(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and supporting case law, supra. 
Point III 
Appellees ask the court for their costs and attorneys 
fees in this matter under Rule 33 and 34 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. This appeal is meant for delay and is a 
frivolous appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellees ask the court to dismiss this appeal, affirm 
the lower courts judgment and award Appellees their costs and 
attorneys fees. To do otherwise would do an injustice to the 
Appellees. They have not received any payments on a admitted 
to promissory note for over four years. 
Dated this 6th day of July, 1993. 
Jones 
fey for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact copy of 
the forgoing Appellants Brief, postage prepaid by U.S. ,Mail 
this $*£ day of July, 1993 to Appellants at: 
Cory Curtis & Arwella Curtis 
312 West 2000 North #D 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84041 
Jones 
torrffey for plaint i f fs /Appel lees 
28 
ADDENDUM 
Trust Deed Note i 
Assignment of Trust Deed Note ii 
Responses by Appellants to Appellees Requests for Admissions, 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents., iii 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law iv 
Judgment v 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure vi 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure vii 
29 
nmKU,..&-..HIK£*3 
....1635.. SQJI .MtJta _.. 
Specs Above ThU Line for Recorder's U M 
T-112733 
4407697 
tHrust Jeeb 
THIS TRUST DEED is msde this day of February 
CORY CURTIS And ATOCLLA CURTIS, hie wife 
whose Address is 42S4 South A l b e r t Dcivs, Sa l t LaJca City, 
(8tf««t sad Numb**) (CHy) 
UTAH TITLE AND ABSTACT COMPAHY 
DARRELL fi. HINCXS 
,19 «7 
, M Trustor, 
Utah (8uu) 
, AS Trus t s / And 
, AS BeneficiAry. 
Trustor hereby CONVEY8 AND WARRANTS' TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST. WITH POWER 
Salt Leke OF SALE, the foUowinf described property situated in County, UtAh: 
All of Lot 3 , VZCAS SUBDIVISION, According to tty# o f f l c U l p l ic thereof, 
recorded In the of f ice of the County Recorder of Ss l t LekA County, UtAh. 
THE BENEFICIARY ACREES TO SUBORDINATED THIS TRUST DEED (ONE TIKE ONLY, EITHER 
TOR A SECOND Ct IP PROPERTY IS REFINANCED) TO A RELIABLE LENDER IN THE AREA., 
PER ACREEXENT OF BOTH PARTIES. 
Toftthor fHth all buddings, fixtures and Improvements thoroon §nd all water rights, rights of wty, 
easements, tents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and sppurtenanoes 
tbortuato now or herecfter used or enjoyed with Mid property, or any pert thereof; 
FOR THE PURP08E OP 8ECURINO payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory 
note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of fl3f 300.00
 f payable to the order of 
Beneficiary at the times, la the Banner and with interest M therein Mi forth, and payment of any 
sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary to protect the security hereof. 
Trustor a p e * to pay all taxes and aseesementa on the above property, to pay all charges and 
aseesements on water or witer stock used on or with said property, not to consult ws/tte, to mstntsin 
adequate fire insurance on improvements on said property, to pay all costs and airsnsos of collec-
tion (indudinf Trustee's and attorney's fees in event of default in payment of the mdebtednees se-
cured hereby and to pay reasonable Trustee's fees for any of the services performed by Trustee 
hereunder, indudinf a reconveyance hereof. _ 
The undersifned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice sf defcfltt^ fficTot any notice of SAIC 
hereunder be mailed to him at the address heremo ' 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
On the / f daycf February • It •*
 9 personally appeared before me 
CORY CURTIS and AXWZLU CURTIS, his wife 
of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me 
My Commission Expiree: 
•NOTE: 
,^Hfar*i4T»r~ 
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Vtmh TUU mm* Abrtrmet Company 
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COUHTY OF 6ALT LAO 
0 * * 1 j o u * F * 
I-
Fofcmory 
/'-1.-06 
.»•» 
^ ^ ^ > ^ f e » 
Arwella P. Curtis 
168 West Center St. 
North Salt Lake City, Utah 84054 
Defendants(s) Cory Curtis and Arwella Curtis response to Plaintiff(s) 
William Christopulos and Elvira Christopulos regarding requests for 
admissions, interrogatories and requests for production of documents-
Civil No. 910900664 CN- Judge James S. Sawaya 
Due to finincial hardship, We, Cory and Arwella Curtis the 
defendant(s) will personally respond to said requests for admissions, 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents from the 
plaint iff(s) • At the time of trial we intend to once again aquire the 
services of the Law offices of Kirton, McConkie and Poleman. 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS- RESPONSE 
Request No* 1: Allegations denied. Interest payments have not been on 
the trust deed note* Semi annual partial payments of $384*75 have 
been made towards the first principle payment of $4,000*00. which is 
due on 2/1/92. 
Request No. 2: Allegations denied. We are not aware of any specific 
semi-annual interest payment amount that was agreed upon at the time 
the agreement was made. No specific semi-annual interest payments are 
set forth in the trust deed note. 
Request No. 3: Allegations denied. Partial payments of $384.75 
towards the first principle payment of $4,000.00 were made on or 
about the four dates listed. 
Request No. 4: Allegations denied. Other partial payments towards the 
first principle payment were made to the plaint iff(s). Documentation 
of such will be forthcoming in 30-90 days. 
INTERROGATORIES-RESPONSE 
1. CQry and Arwella Curtis, the defendants 
2. Already incorporated in response to said requests. 
3a- The .question is unclear. What is the difference between 
"purchasing" and "receiving" said property? Admission is made that 
defendants purchased said property. 
3b- Enclosed please find the following documents; 
a) Trust Deed Note 
b) Assignment of Trust Deed 
c) Trust Deed 
d) A s s i g n m e n t o f M o r t g a g e p a p e r w o r k f o r t h c o m i n g i n 3 0 - 9 0 d a y s . 
4 . In A u g u s t o f 1987 I r e c e i v e d t h e e n c l o s e d l e t t e r from W i l l i a m and 
£*£ 
when the original purchase agreement was made, and dispite the fact 
that no specific semi-annual payment amounts were agreed upon or 
listed in the legal agreements, they stated in the letter that 
semi-annual payments were to be made in the amount of $38U.75» This 
was the first time, six months after the trust deed note was signed, 
that the amount of $38U.75 was ever mentioned to us as a semi-annual 
payment amount by anyone. Please note that the letter does not refer 
to the payment as an "interest" payment. Although the payment 
schedule that the Plaintiff sent us was not accurate or 
representative of the agreement that we had made, we wanted to make 
semi-annual payments towards the principle payment of $U,000.00 that 
would be due 2/1/92. 
5. We the defendants do not remember having any written or oral 
communication directly with the plaintiff(s) at the time of the 
transaction. Likewise we do not remember having any written or oral 
communication directly with Mr. Darrel Hicks at or during the time o 
the transaction. All communication was with Mr. Hicks agent, Mr. Eri 
Glenn. Except for the documents provided, all communication with Mr. 
Glenn was oral. Since the transaction took place over four years ago 
it is difficult to remember in detail all communications refering to 
said transaction. We are not aware of any default of the trust deed 
note relating to the subject matter of the lawsuit. 
a,b,c) We are currently making an attempt to document discussions 
that took place with Mr. Glenn. Due to our current employment-travel 
obligations we require additional time in responding to this reply-
30-90 days. 
6,7>8>9910 ,11 & 12. These interogatories are premature and therefore 
inappropriate at this time. We the defendant are under no obligation 
to defend our position regarding the fraud, intentional 
misrepresentation, negligence, etc. that took place at the time of 
the transaction until the trust deed note has gone into default. 
13» We, the defendant(s) are currently working with our bank and 
other bookkeeping entities to collect and verify said documentation 
of payments that have been made pertaining to said lawsuit. We 
require 30-90 days to provide you with this information. 
Sincerely, 
Dated f^clf^ s 15th day of May 1991 
Kyle w. Jones 1744 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 2650 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-7771 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM CHRISTOPULOS & ] 
ELVIRA CHRISTOPULOS, ] 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ; 
CORY CURTIS & ] 
ARWELLA CURTIS, ] 
Defendants. 
| JUDGMENT 
| Civil No. 910900664CN 
i Judge: James Sawaya 
The above entitled matter came on properly before the 
above entitled court pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. The Court having read the pleadings on file 
in this matter and having heard the statements of defendant 
Cory Curtis at pretrial on September 22, 1992 and being fully 
advised in the premises; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT: 
1. Plaintiffs motion for Summary Judgment be granted. 
2. That defendants counterclaim be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
V 
3. That Plaintiff have judgment against the defendants, 
Cory Curtis and Arwella Curtis as follows: 
$16,767.66 principal and interest to date; 
$ 1,601,00 Attorneys fees to date; and 
$ 91.50 accrued costs to date; and 
$18,460.16 TOTAL JUDGMENT, 
with interest thereon at the judgment rate of twelve percent 
(12%) per annum until paid, plus after accruing costs and 
attorneys fees. 
DATED: ft (JV 7| f ^ ^ 
BY THE COURT: 
m 
Honorable James Sawaya 
District Judge 
Kyle W. Jones 1744 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Beneficial Life Tower, Suite 2650 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-7771 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM CHRISTOPULOS & 
ELVIRA CHRISTOPULOS, 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ; 
CORY CURTIS & ] 
ARWELLA CURTIS, 
Defendants. 
) FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Civil No. 910900664CN 
t Judge: James Sawaya 
This matter came on properly before the above entitled 
court pursuant Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration for 
a decision on plaintiffs' Motion to reconsider plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The court has reviewed the pleadings in this matter 
and has talked to the defendant Cory Curtis and counsel for 
the plaintiff at the pretrial on September 22, 1992. The 
Court being fully informed granted plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment by minute entry on October 22, 1992. 
IV 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs and defendants are both residents of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah and have admitted to jurisdiction 
of this Court over the person and the subject matter and has 
admitted venue is proper. 
2. Defendants, Cory Curtis and Arwella Curtis entered 
into a written Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note on February 1, 
1987 with a Mr. Darrell B. Hicks which is a valid and proper 
contract. 
3. On March 6, 1987 the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note 
mentioned infra was assigned to the plaintiffs. 
4. The terms of the Trust Deed Note required defendants 
to pay to the holder of the note, here the plaintiffs, the sum 
of $13,500.00 plus interest over time. 
5. The defendants were to make payments of principal and 
interest under the terms of the Trust Deed Note as follows: 
Semi-annual interest payments representing 5.7% per 
annum of the unpaid balance were to commence on August 1, 1987 
and continue through the term of the contract. Lump sum 
principal payments of $4,000.00 were due on February 1, 1992; 
$4,000.00 was to be due on February 1, 1997; and $5,500.00 
plus any accrued interest, representing the last semi-annual 
interest payment, as a final payment was to be due on February 
1, 2002. 
6. The interest accumulated on $13,500.00 at the rate of 
5-7% per annum is $64,125 per month or $384.75 semi annually. 
7. Defendants made four (4) interest payments, semi-
annually of $384.75. The payments were received on August 1, 
1987; February 1, 1988; August 1, 1989 and February 1, 1989. 
8. No payments have been made on the principal of the 
Trust Deed Note and Defendants are in default under the terms 
of the subject Trust Deed Note. 
9. The amount due and owing under the terms of the Trust 
Deed Note due to the default of the defendants is $16,767.66 
and said amount is reasonable. 
10. Plaintiffs' retained an attorney to help them collect 
under the terms of the trust deed note and the amount claimed 
to be owing to the attorney in the amount of $1,601.00 is 
reasonable. 
11. Plaintiffs have made no misrepresentations to the 
defendants. 
12. Defendants were acting properly in commencing this 
action at the time the lawsuit was commenced. 
Having entered its Findings of Fact, the Court now enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the 
subject matter and venue is proper. 
2. The defendants are both liable for the sums due and 
owing under the subject Trust Deed Note to the plaintiffs. 
3. The Trust Deed Note is an enforceable contract 
between the defendants and the plaintiffs and the defendants 
have not established any facts to any alleged defenses. 
4. The defendants have not established their right to 
any recovery under their counterclaim and the counterclaim 
should be dismissed. The claim by the plaintiffs was 
meritorious as presented and alleged by the plaintiffs and 
their counsel. 
5. Defendants are responsible to pay plaintiffs 
reasonable attorneys fees in this matter pursuant to the terms 
of the Trust Deed Note. 
6. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their costs in 
this matter and interest in this matter. 
7. The Court shall entered judgment accordingly. 
DATED: 
BY THE COURT: 
i£i 
Honorable James Sawaya 
District Court Judge 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and s t a t e separately i ts 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall simi-
larly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent t h a t the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as. the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court follow-
ing the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The 
court shall , however, issue a brief writ ten s ta tement of the ground for i ts 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) A m e n d m e n t - Upon motion of a party made not later t h a n 10 days after 
ent ry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional find-
ings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with 
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact a re made 
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of t h e sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not 
the party raising the question has made in the district court a n objection to 
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judg-
ment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of f ind ings of fact a n d c o n c l u s i o n s of law. Except in actions 
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the 
part ies to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear a t the t r ia l ; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes . 
(Amended effective J an . 1, 1987.) 
Compiler's Notes. -
Rule 52, FJLC.P. 
Cross-References. 
- This rule is similar to 
Masters. Rule 53. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Adoption. 
—Abandonment of contract. 
—Advisory verdict. 
—Breach of contract. 
—Child custody. 
—ContempC 
—Credibility of witnesses. 
—Denial of motion. 
—Divorce decree modifications. 
—Easement. 
—Evidentiary disputes. 
—Juvenile action. 
—Material issues. 
Harmless error. 
—Submission by prevailing party. 
Court's discretion. 
—Water dispute. 
Findings of state engineer. 
Amendment 
—Motion. 
Conformance with original findings. 
New trial. 
Notice of appeal. 
Time. 
Tolling of appeal period. 
When made. 
—Overruling or vacation. 
Another district judge. 
Lack of notice. 
Child custody awards. 
Criminal cases. 
Effect. 
—Preclusion of summary judgment. 
—Relation to pleadings. 
Failure to object to findings. 
How findings entered. 
Judicial reviiew. 
—Standard of review. 
Conclusions of law. 
Criminal cases. 
Criminal trials. 
Findings of facts by jury. 
Juvenile proceedings. 
Purpose of rule. 
Stipulations. 
Sufficiency. 
—Allegations of pleadings. 
—Burden on appeal. 
—Found insufficient. 
Vacation of judgment. 
—Found sufficient. 
—Opinion or memorandum of decision. 
—Recitals of procedures. 
—Technical error. 
vl i 
that issue Do*ne\ State Bank \ Major-
Blakene> Corp 545 P 2d 507 (Utah 1976) 
—Setting aside proper. 
Where plaintiff served defendant with a 
summons, and left a copy with the defendant 
which was not the same as the original, the 
court had jurisdiction but sufficient confusion 
was created so that a motion to set aside the 
default judgment should have been granted 
and the defendant allowed to plead consistent 
with our declared policy that in case of uncer-
tainty, default judgments should be set aside to 
allow trial on the merits Locke v. Peterson, 3 
Utah 2d 415, 285 P.2d 1111 (1955). 
Default judgment and writ of garnishment 
were properly set aside where trial court failed 
to obtain jurisdiction over defendant because 
summons was not timely issued. Fibreboard 
Paper Prods Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65. 
475 P.2d 1005 (1970). 
Where appellants, plaintiffs in a civil action, 
scheduled aopearance in another court on that 
date, but due to fact that there were no lam or 
motion days between time objection was filed 
and trial date, objection was never heard, re-
fusal to set aside default judgment entered 
when appellants failed to appear on trial date 
was an abuse of discretion Griffiths v. Ham-
mon, 560 P_2d 1375 (Utah 1977). 
Time for appeal. 
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal 
from a default judgment in a city court ran 
from the date of notice of entry of such judg-
ment, rather than from the date of judgment. 
Buckner v. Main Realtv & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 
124, 288 P-2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank 
& Trust Co v Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A!d)). 
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v. 
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965); 
J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486 
(Utah 1979r. Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 fUtab 
1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason-
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for 
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Gra-
ham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937. 
Am. J u r . 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments 
§§ 1152 to 1213 
C.J.S. — 49 C JJS. Judgments §§ 187 to 218. 
A.L.R. — Necessity of taking proof as to lia-
bility against defaulting defendant, 8 AJLR.3d 
1070. 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus-
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 AXJL3d 
1272. 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam-
ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Opening default or default judgment rbtWn^ 
to have been obtained because of attorney's 
mistake as to time or place of appearance, 
trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A LR3d 
1255. 
Failure to give notice of application for de^ 
fault judgment where notice is required only 
by custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383. 
Failure of party or his attorney to appear af] 
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
Default judgments against the United Stafceal 
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Qigj] 
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
Key Numbers. — Judgment *» 92 to 134. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For c la imant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, m; 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,. 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in Ids 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to thi§ 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories; 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
VII 
^racticanie ascerrain wnat material iacts exist witnout substantial contro-
*,orsv and what mater ial facts are actually and in good faith controverted It 
-hall thereupon make an order specifying the facts tha t appear wi thout sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in t h e 
action as are just Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be at tached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories. 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When aff idavits are unavai lable . Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for j udgmen t or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is jus t . 
(g) Affidavits m a d e in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler's Notes, — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Contempt generally. 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. §§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Affidavit. 
—Contents. 
—Corporation. 
—Experts. 
—Inconsistency with deposition. 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
Resting on pleadings. 
—Objection. 
—Sufficiency. 
Hearsay and opinion testimony 
—Superseding pleadings. 
—Unpleaded defenses. 
—Verified pleading. 
—Waiver of right to contest. 
—When unavailable. 
Exclusive control of facts. 
—Who may make. 
Affirmative defense. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Appeal. 
—Adversely affected party. 
—Standard of review. 
Attorney's fees. 
Availability of motion. 
Cross-motions. 
Damages. 
Discovery. 
Disputed facts. 
Evidence. 
—Facts considered. 
—Improper evidence. 
—Proof. 
—Weight of testimony. 
Improper party plaintiff. 
Issue of fact. 
—Corporate existence. 
—Deeds. 
—Lease as security. 
Judicial attitude. 
Motion for new trial. 
Motion to dismiss. 
Motion to reconsider. 
Notice. 
—Provision not jurisdictional. 
—Waiver of defect. 
Procedural due process. 
Purpose. 
